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I. Introduction
The proliferation of criminal laws in different legal systems has made legal practitioners and
scholars deliberate upon the present day relevance of old age principles and concepts. The
maxim ignorantia juris non excusat (ignorantia juris hereinafter) also falls in this category.
The application of criminal law is said to rest on the maxim ignorantia juris, meaning
ignorance of law is no excuse. The application of the maxim has from time immemorial been
defended on grounds of convenience, utility, and community interests.1 At the same time
it has been challenged on grounds of legality and morality.2 The application of the maxim
in criminal matters is secured through penal laws. These laws are further validated through
judicial pronouncements. Penal statutes and judicial pronouncements have largely been the
basis to determine the exceptions and scope of the maxim.
1Sharon L. Davies, “The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of Excusable Ignorance”, Duke
L. Journal, Vol 48 (1998); Jerome Hall, “Comment on Error Juris”, The American Journal of Comparative Law,
Vol 24 (1976); Dam M. Kahan, “Ignorance of Law Is An Excuse –But Only For The Virtuous”, Michigan Law
Review , Vol 96:127,(1997); Vera Bolgar, “The Present Function of The Maxim ignornatia juris neminem excusat-
A Comparative Study”, Iowa L Rev. 628 (1967).
2Paul Rozenweig, “Ignorance of Law is no Excuse: But it is a Reality”, No. 2812 The Backgrounder, 2 (June
2013). Rozenzweig on the maxim writes, “the phrase captures an important concept about culpability. It stems
from a time when criminal law was grounded in morality and a shared understanding of wrongfulness and when
crimes were self-evident wrongs—what the law calls “wrong in their essence,” or “malum in se.” The rule that
“ignorance of the law is no excuse” was born at a time when there were fewer than a dozen common law felonies,
and all those crimes stemmed from and mirrored a commonly shared moral code…Today, the criminal law is a
collection of social preferences. Some of them are obvious and reflect common sense notions of wrongfulness,
but many reflect only a legislative judgment…”
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Breaking it down to a single case in hand, several factors come into picture including the
nature of the crime in question, the mental state of the person accused, the conduct of the
accused person, the objective or public utility of the criminal legislation or provision, and
the reasons or justifications offered for its rigid or qualified application. The single case is
viewed in light of the general provisions of criminal law of the legal system in which the case
is being tried. The uniqueness of each case and the criminal statutes of legal systems make it
both complex and conducive to generalize or conclude on the true import and application of
the maxim ignorantia juris.
II. Exceptions to the rule
An overview of the legal developments in different jurisdictions indicates that determinations
on the application of the maxim ignorantis juris need jurisdprudential and legal reconsidera-
tion. According to Ciuni and Tuzet, “in the last decade, a host of different legal systems have
defined some restrictions to the scope of Ignorantia legis non excusat. These restrictions de-
pend on some qualification of the relavant ignorance, and they introduce, de facto, standards
of excusability”.3 Arnold states, “the academic literature on inculpable ignorance of the law
has also revealed the emergence of several contrasting themes”.4 Further, conceptual deter-
minations appear lacking based on arguments about morality, reasonableness, good faith and
injustice.
Husak in this regard pushes for a reconsideration of the rule itself, as distinct from its
exceptions. According to Husak, there has been a unmistakable trend to expand the conditions
under which ignorance of law should be a defence. Based on the theories and decisions the
trend has merely served to enlarge the number of exceptions without questioning the rule.
He writes, “no one has proposed to reverse the common law presumption by countenancing
ignorance of law as a defence, and then describing exceptions under which ignorance of law
would not exculpate”.5
3 Roberto Ciuni, Giovanni Tuzet, “Inevitable ignorance as a standard for excusability: An Epistemological
Analysis”, Vol. 196: 10 Synthese (March 2019).
4Nciko Arnold, “Ignorance of the Law is no Defence: Street Law as a Means to Reconcile this Maxim with
the Rule of Law”, Strathmore Law Review, 27 (June 2018).
5Douglas N. Husak, “Ignorance of Law and Duties of Citizenship” , Vol. 14: 1 Legal Studies (March 1994).
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III. Statutes and Interpretations
Arguments for reform have been advocated in light of both penal statutes and judicial pro-
nouncements on the subject. In 1971 for instance, the Law Commission of India in its 42nd
Report provided an extensive discussion on the subject. The Report defended the provisions
of the Indian Penal Code which make no exception to the rule. The report, bearing in mind the
conditions of the Indian society, nature of penal laws and opinion of judicial courts provided
the following conclusions;
1. On justification: As per the report, the real justification for not allowing mistake of law
as a defence seems to be that the operation of a provision of the law is intended to be
independent of its being known to everybody and it ought to be so. If it were not so,
great uncertainty will be introduced in the enforcement of the law and may well lead to
justice.
2. On collateral enquiries : The report says, if exceptions are provided, many investiga-
tions into offences would have to branch off into collateral enquiries because it would
be obviously unfair to send up the person charged for a trial when there is something in
his plea of ignorance of the legal provision.
3. Sentencing by courts: The report provides, judicial courts under existing provisions if
satisfied about the genuiness of the plea of ignorance take account of it while passing a
sentence. We do not therefore recommend any change in the existing position.
4. Role of foreign precedents : The report states, since the magnitude of the population,
the number of prosecutions involving such issues, the literacy of the citizens and other
similar factors, which vary from country to country, will also have to be taken into
account. If other countries have expressly provided for a defence, it is not necessary
that it would work in India.
In another context, new concepts for minimizing the effects or rigid application of the
maxim have been advocated. Authors Ciuni and Tuzet explore the concept of inevitable ig-
norance as distinct from ignorance that could be avoided.6 While there analysis is based on
the case law of the Italian courts, they open a discussion on the following points; whether
inevitability is a necessity? And under what possible conditions can ignorance be rendered
inevitable? They also bring in key jurisprudential questions on the sanctity of the maxim in
both criminal and constitutional law in light of the unrestricted application of the maxim as
6Supra note 3. Also see case Nicholas Brady Heien v. North Carolina 574 U. S.(2014).
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unconstitutional. Based on their case analysis of several decisions, Ciuni and Tuzet offer the
following points as four crucial conditions implicit in the notion of inevitable ignorance of a
person about a given norm; (a) the agent entertains a false belief about the norm (b) the agent
checked all the evidence that we could reasonably require that she checked, if any; (c) the
evidence the agent actually checked, or presupposed as acquired already, supports the false
proposition believed by the agent; (d) the agent was rational in accepting the evidence, since
the latter was to be deemed trustworthy.
While most arguments in favour of re-defining the scope and application of the maxim
have been made in light of penal law and its application by judicial courts, over the years
there has been a linking of the discussion with notions of constitutional morality and morality
of the penal order. These shifts have made the maxim a curious case for re-consideration both
in law and in penal jurisprudence.
IV. Conclusion
The contrasting themes and approaches on the subject further warrant for a jurisprudential
exploration of the maxim ignorantia juris in criminal law. The same would mark out areas of
agreement and uniformity across jurisdictions, coupled with the areas of disagreement. The
exercise would enhance the legitimacy of criminal law by ensuring a smoother process of
norm determination, internalization and application.
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